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IN THE

United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
_______________

Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067
_______________
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through Attorney General Pam Bondi, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees / Cross-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants / Cross-Appellees.
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_______________
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION
ET AL. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS / CROSSAPPELLEES
_______________
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the District Court erred in holding that the individual mandate of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is not a valid exercise of
Congress’s commerce power.
2. Whether the District Court correctly held that the ACA’s expansion of
the Medicaid program is consistent with Congress’s powers under the Spending
Clause.
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The American Hospital Association, Association of American Medical
Colleges, Catholic Health Association of the United States, Federation of
American Hospitals, National Association of Children’s Hospitals, and National
Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems (the “Hospital Associations”)
respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.1
The American Hospital Association (“AHA”) represents nearly 5,000
hospitals, health care systems, and networks, plus 37,000 individual members.
AHA members are committed to improving the health of communities they serve
and to helping ensure that care is available to, and affordable for, all Americans.
The AHA educates its members on health care issues and advocates to ensure that
their perspectives are considered in formulating health care policy.
The Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) represents about
300 major non-federal teaching hospitals, all 134 allopathic medical schools, and
the clinical faculty and medical residents who provide care to patients there.
The Catholic Health Association of the United States (“CHA”) is the
national leadership organization for the Catholic health ministry. CHA’s more
1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, amici certify that all parties
have consented to the filing of this brief. Amici likewise certify that no party’s
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel
contributed money intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission; and no
person other than amici and their members and counsel contributed money

2
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than 2,000 members operate in all 50 states and offer a full continuum of care,
from primary care to assisted living. CHA works to advance the ministry’s
commitment to a just, compassionate health care system that protects life.
The Federation of American Hospitals (“FAH”) is the national
representative of investor-owned or managed community hospitals and health
systems. FAH has nearly 1,000 member hospitals in 46 states and the District of
Columbia. These members include rural and urban teaching and non-teaching
hospitals and provide a wide range of acute, post-acute, and ambulatory services.
The National Association of Children’s Hospitals (“N.A.C.H.”) is a trade
organization that supports its 141 hospital members in addressing public policy
issues. N.A.C.H.’s mission is to promote the health and well-being of children and
their families through support of children’s hospitals and health systems.
The National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems (“NAPH”)
is comprised of some 140 of the nation’s largest metropolitan safety net hospitals
and health systems, committed to providing health care to all without regard to
ability to pay. NAPH represents members’ interests in matters before Congress,
the Executive Branch, and the courts.
The six Hospital Associations represent virtually every hospital and health
system in the country—public and private; urban and rural; teaching and children’s

intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission.

3
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hospitals; investor-owned and non-profit. Their members will be deeply affected
by the outcome of this case. American hospitals are committed to the well-being
of their communities and offer substantial community-benefit services. As part of
that mission, they dedicate massive resources to caring for the uninsured. The
uninsured, after all, need health care like everyone else. Nearly every hospital with
an emergency department is required to provide emergency services to anyone,
regardless of ability to pay. And even when an uninsured patient arrives planning
to pay his or her own way, that patient may struggle to pay for an extended stay.
The upshot: Hospitals treat tens of millions of uninsured individuals each year,
and most of that care is uncompensated. Indeed, in 2009 alone, hospitals provided
more than $39 billion in uncompensated care to the uninsured and under-insured.
American Hosp. Ass’n, Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet 4 (Dec.
2010) (“Fact Sheet”);2 see also J. Hadley et al., Covering The Uninsured In 2008:
Current Costs, Sources Of Payment, And Incremental Costs 403, Health Affairs
(Aug. 25, 2008) (“Covering The Uninsured”).3 And while hospitals do all they can
to assist patients, burdens on uninsured individuals remain heavy. Millions of
families are just one major illness from financial ruin.

2

Available at
http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2010/pdf/10uncompensatedcare.pdf.
3
Available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/27/5/w399.

4
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That is why the Hospital Associations favored enactment of the ACA.
While the legislation is not perfect, it would extend coverage to millions more
Americans. To undo the ACA now would be to maintain an unacceptable status
quo—a result that is neither prudent nor compelled by the Constitution.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The District Court’s ruling on the ACA’s individual mandate was error
for at least three separate reasons.
First, contrary to the District Court’s conclusion, “activity” is not an
independent requirement of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
Second, even if “activity” were an independent requirement for Commerce
Clause regulation, such activity plainly exists here. The vast majority of uninsured
individuals are quite actively engaged in interstate commerce; they seek and
receive tens of billions of dollars a year worth of health care services. Third
parties—including hospitals, doctors, clinics, health care systems, and other
patients—end up absorbing the majority of those costs. The individual mandate
does not compel uninsured individuals to participate in interstate commerce; it
merely directs them to arrange payment for the services they already are seeking
and receiving in interstate commerce.

5
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Third, even if “activity” were required and even if it were absent here, that
would be irrelevant. Congress had authority to enact the individual mandate as an
essential element of the ACA’s larger regulatory scheme.
2. The District Court correctly rejected Appellees’ challenge to the ACA’s
expansion of Medicaid, finding it contrary to well-established case law. The
ACA’s Medicaid provisions are not impermissibly coercive. And Appellees would
set a dangerous precedent by effectively forcing Congress to obtain consent from
each participating state before modifying the Medicaid program to address the
shifting needs of patients and health care providers.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CLAIM THAT UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS ARE “INACTIVE”
IS LEGALLY IRRELEVANT.
The individual-mandate argument embraced by the District Court is

premised on the notion that, by requiring many Americans to obtain health
insurance, Congress is regulating inactivity. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *29 (N.D. Fla.
Jan. 31, 2011). In particular, the District Court explained “that the individual
mandate seeks to regulate economic inactivity, which is the very opposite of
economic activity. And because activity is required under the Commerce Clause,
the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s commerce power, as it is understood,
defined, and applied in the existing Supreme Court case law.” Id. These

6
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conclusions fail for at least three separate reasons. Amici address the first two only
briefly, as they are more fully set forth by the Government. See Brief of the
United States 32-49.
First, the District Court erred in finding that “activity” is an independent
requirement of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. The
Supreme Court has never created an “activity” requirement. On the contrary, the
Court has used the term only as a descriptor in discussing the broad outlines of
Congress’s power, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)
(explaining that legal standards for the Commerce Clause “are not precise
formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be”), and has not used it in
every instance when describing congressional power. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (Congress may regulate “a practice” that poses “a threat to
the national market”). Nor would it make sense to require “activity” as a separate
prong of the Commerce Clause analysis. The relevant question under the
Commerce Clause is not whether Congress is targeting activity, but whether the
object of congressional regulation is causing a substantial “impact on commerce.”
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968).
Indeed, to superimpose an activity requirement “is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties,” Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-590 (1937),
because whether a regulated individual is engaged in relevant activity depends on

7
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one’s perspective: As we discuss infra at 20-23, almost any individual subject to
regulation can be described as “active” or “inactive,” depending on the level of
generality one adopts. The law does not turn on these sorts of malleable
distinctions. And when such distinctions have been created in the past, they have
quickly been abandoned as unworkable failures. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 120 (1942) (“[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by
reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such
as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ * * * .”).
Second, even if “activity” were required to justify a free-standing regulation,
and even if it were absent here—which it is not, as we discuss at length below—
that would be irrelevant. The individual mandate is not a free-standing regulation;
it is, instead, an important component of the ACA’s comprehensive regulatory
reform of the interstate health care and health insurance markets. See Mead v.
Holder, Civ. Action No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *17 (D.D.C. Feb. 22,
2011) (“[T]he individual mandate is best viewed not as a stand-alone reform, but
as an essential element of the larger regulatory scheme contained in the ACA.”).
As such, Congress has the authority to enact it. As the Supreme Court explained in
Raich, Congress is well within its Commerce Clause authority when it regulates
individuals—even individuals not participating in interstate commerce—as an
integral part of “a lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive

8
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framework” governing a larger interstate market. 545 U.S. at 24; accord Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981). The ACA is “a lengthy and detailed
statute creating a comprehensive framework” governing an interstate market if
ever there was one. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24. Because the individual mandate plays
an integral role in facilitating Congress’s regulation of that market, it is a valid
exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
II.

THE CLAIM THAT UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS ARE “INACTIVE”
IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT.
The District Court’s analysis fails for both of these reasons . But amici wish

to focus in greater detail on a third, independent reason why this Court should
reverse: Even if the Commerce Clause limited Congress to the regulation of
“activity,” the requirement would be met in this case because uninsured Americans
unquestionably participate in relevant economic activity—they obtain health care
services. Indeed, the uninsured engage in that activity in massive numbers and
with great frequency. The vast majority of uninsured individuals receive health
care services regularly, and the cost (to the patients themselves, those who treat
them, and taxpayers) is extraordinary. Thus an individual’s decision to purchase or
decline health insurance is nothing other than a decision about whether he will pay,
or ask others to pay, for existing and future health care costs—i.e., how he will pay
for services he will receive. That is quintessential economic activity.

9
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The District Court concluded that the uninsured are engaged in mere
“inactivity” by focusing on the health insurance market and ignoring the broader
market Congress chose to regulate through the ACA—the health care market. See
42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A). The Court should reject this invitation to redefine the
lens through which Congress viewed the facts. Congress was entitled to perceive
its task as the regulation of the whole health care market, and to recognize that
health insurance serves as a financing mechanism in that broader market.4 Under
rational basis review, the Court must “respect the level of generality at which
Congress chose to act.” United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir.
2007) (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 22).
A.

Because The Uninsured Are Virtually Certain To Accrue Health
Care Costs, The Decision To Purchase Or Decline Insurance Is
“Economic Activity.”

All Americans—insured and uninsured alike—make use of the health care
system, thus accruing health care costs. Given this reality, all individuals must
4

In any event, the health insurance market and the health care market are
inextricably linked. As the District Court for the District of Columbia recently
acknowledged, because health care providers pass certain uncompensated health
care costs on to private insurers, “the individual decision to forgo health insurance,
when considered in the aggregate, leads to substantially higher insurance premiums
for those other individuals who do obtain coverage.” Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at
*16. Higher premiums may, in turn, dissuade some consumers from purchasing
health insurance, increasing the size of the uninsured population and thereby
ultimately increasing the burden on health care providers. In sum, efforts to
regulate payment in the health care market invariably will affect the health
insurance market and vice versa.

10
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make a decision as to how to finance these costs. That decision is economic
activity, and the individual mandate regulates this marketplace behavior.
1.

Simply stated, uninsured Americans are engaged in economic activity

because they seek and obtain large amounts of health care, and someone must pay
the tab. In 2008 alone, the most recent year for which full statistics are available,
the uninsured received $86 billion worth of health care from all providers.
Covering The Uninsured 399, 402-403; see infra at 15-18. The uninsured also
made more than 20 million visits to hospital emergency rooms. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., New Data Say Uninsured Account for Nearly One-Fifth
of Emergency Room Visits (July 15, 2009).5 And without the individual mandate,
those numbers likely would continue to rise. The number of adults aged 18-64
who go without health insurance for some portion of the year has been increasing
steadily over the past few years. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital
Signs: Access to Health Care (Nov. 9, 2010).6 Approximately 50 million people
fell into this category over the course of the past twelve months. Id.
The vast majority of these millions of uninsured individuals—at least 94
percent—seek and receive health care services at some point. J. E. O’Neill and
D.M. O’Neill, Who Are the Uninsured? An Analysis of America’s Uninsured

5
6

Available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/07/20090715b.html.
Available at http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/HealthcareAccess/index.html.
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Population, Their Characteristics and Their Health 21 & Table 9 (2009) (“Who Are
The Uninsured”).7 For example, 68 percent of the uninsured population had a
routine check-up in the past five years, and 50 percent had one in the past two
years. Id. at 20. Sixty-five percent of uninsured women had a mammogram within
the last five years; 80 percent of uninsured women had a Pap smear in that time
frame; and 86 percent of uninsured individuals had a blood pressure check. Id. at
20-22 & Table 9. The takeaway is simple enough: “[T]he uninsured receive
significant amounts of healthcare[.]” Id. at 24. The uninsured thus are not
“inactive” in the health care market; they are frequent participants. And their
decision to decline health insurance is an economic decision directly related to the
services they routinely receive. It is a decision about how to pay—or ask others to
pay—for services rendered.
2.

Nor is there any doubt that the overwhelming majority of uninsured

individuals do—and must—participate in this market, even absent the individual
mandate. Nearly all people, sooner or later, receive health care whether they
would have chosen to or not. When a person has a medical crisis, or is in a car
accident, or falls and breaks a limb, he or she is transported to the hospital and
provided care. Most Americans thus cannot simply “exit” the health care market.
The choice they face, instead, is how to pay for the care they inevitably will
7

Available at http://epionline.org/studies/oneill_06-2009.pdf.

12
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receive. By forgoing insurance, individuals simply shift the burden of their health
care payments to others. See infra at 15-18. The health care market is unique in
this respect. The combination of actions it requires of consumers—accepting
services and deciding how to pay for them—is economic activity, pure and simple,
and is subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
While the District Court acknowledged that many uninsured individuals
seek and obtain health care services, it expressed concern that there always may be
some small percentage of uninsured individuals who do not receive health care. It
suggested that that fact renders the individual mandate unconstitutional. See
Florida, 2011 WL 285683, at *26 (explaining that to avoid “cast[ing] the net” too
“wide,” Congress should regulate the uninsured only when they actually seek
health care services). But the fact that some small percentage of uninsured
Americans may not receive care does not change the constitutional calculus.
Congress may consider and regulate the market in the aggregate, and the courts
will not “excise individual components of that larger scheme.” Raich, 545 U.S. at
22; see also Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 192-193.
3.

The District Court’s “inactivity” finding also obscures an important

reality: Although the uninsured population seeks and receives significant amounts
of preventive care, the uninsured still receive far less preventive care than the
insured. Who Are The Uninsured at 20-22 & Table 9. The decision of some

13
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uninsured individuals to put off regular preventive care actually increases their
activity in the health care market in the long run. That is because “[d]elaying or
forgoing needed care can lead to serious health problems, making the uninsured
more likely to be hospitalized for avoidable conditions.” Kaiser Comm’n on
Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Uninsured & the Difference Health Care Makes 2
(Sept. 2010).8 As the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention observed:
“Approximately 40 percent of persons in the United States have one or more
chronic disease[s], and continuity in the health care they receive is essential to
prevent complications, avoidable long-term expenditures, and premature
mortality.” J. Reichard, CDC: Americans Uninsured at Least Part of the Year on
the Rise, Harming Public Health, CQ Healthbeat News (Nov. 9, 2010) (emphasis
added). For example, “[s]kipping care for hypertension can lead to stroke and
costly rehabilitation” and “[s]kipping it for asthma can lead to hospitalization.” Id.
This is not mere rhetoric. Studies have shown that “[l]ength of stay” in the
hospital is “significantly longer” for uninsured patients who suffer from heart
attacks, stroke, and pneumonia than for insured patients with those conditions—a
disparity researchers attribute at least in part to “uninsured patients’ lack of access
to primary care and preventive services.” E. Bakhtiari, In-Hospital Mortality Rates

8

Available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-12.pdf.
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Higher for the Uninsured, HealthLeaders Media (June 14, 2010).9 For this reason,
too, it makes little sense to suggest that people affected by the individual mandate
are inactive. Any decision to avoid the health care market in the short term simply
produces more market activity in the medium and long term. Congress had the
authority to recognize as much, and to regulate the uninsureds’ choice about who
will pay for that market activity.
B.

Care Provided To The Uninsured Costs Billions Per Year, And
Everyone In The Nation Helps To Pay The Bill.

Uninsured Americans, in short, regularly obtain health care services and
decide how (and whether) to pay for them—“activities” in the market by any
measure. And those services are costly. As mentioned above, the uninsured pay a
substantial portion of the bill themselves—a whopping $30 billion in 2008 alone.
Covering The Uninsured 399. But an even greater share is borne by hospitals,
health systems, doctors, insurers, and even other patients. Because the uninsured
create an enormous cost for the market, the activity they engage in is “economic,”
and Congress may regulate it.
1.

To begin with the providers: Of the $86 billion in care the uninsured

received in 2008, about $56 billion was uncompensated care provided by hospitals,

9

Available at http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/QUA252419/InHospital-Mortality-Rates-Higher-for-the-Uninsured.html.
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doctors, clinics, and health care systems.10 That $56 billion exceeds the gross
domestic product of some 70 percent of the world’s nations. Covering The
Uninsured 399, 403; see T. Serafin, Just How Much is $60 Billion?, Forbes
Magazine (June 27, 2006).11 All hospitals and health care providers, large and
small, shoulder these uncompensated-care costs. See National Ass’n of Pub. Hosp.
& Health Sys., What is a Safety Net Hospital? 1 (2008).12 But the costs fall
particularly heavily on “core safety-net” hospitals—the term for hospitals or health
systems that serve a substantial share of uninsured, Medicaid, and other vulnerable
patients. Institute of Med., America’s Health Care Safety Net: Intact But
Endangered (2000).13 For these hospitals, uncompensated care amounts to some
21 percent of total costs. What is a Safety Net Hospital? 1.
To be sure, hospitals bear many of these expenses as part of their charitable
mission—but that does not change the fact that an uninsured individual’s decision
to seek care is, and triggers, economic activity. A description of how hospitals
10

This is derived by subtracting $30 billion in uninsured self-payment from the
$86 billion total. See supra at 11, 15. Of the $56 billion in uncompensated care,
some $35 billion is provided by hospitals, and the rest by doctors, clinics, and other
providers. Covering The Uninsured 402-403.
11
Available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/06/27/billion-donation-gatescz_ts_0627buffett.html.
12
Available at http://literacyworks.org/hls/hls_conf_materials/
WhatIsASafetyNetHospital.pdf.
13
Available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2000/
Americas-Health-Care-Safety-Net/Insurance%20Safety%20Net%202000%20%
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work to serve uninsured patients illustrates the point. As noted above, nearly every
hospital with an emergency department is required to provide emergency services
to anyone, regardless of ability to pay. See Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act of 1986 (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. But even when the
patient’s need does not rise to the level of an emergency, hospitals provide free or
deeply discounted care. Most hospitals’ policies “specify that certain patients,”
such as “those who do not qualify for Medicare or other coverage and with
household incomes up to a specified percentage of the Federal Poverty Level or
‘FPL,’ ” will not be charged at all for the care they receive. Healthcare Fin. Mgmt.
Ass’n, A Report from the Patient Friendly Billing Project 8 (2005).14 Other
patients, such as those “with incomes up to some higher specified percentage of the
FPL,” will “qualify for discounts on their hospital bills.” Id.
Most uninsured (and under-insured) patients with incomes that exceed these
levels, however, also face difficulty paying for services, especially if they require
an extended hospital stay. Despite their incomes, some may qualify for reducedprice care under hospital policies that assist the “medically indigent”—i.e.,
“patients whose incomes may be relatively high, but [whose] hospital bills exceed
a certain proportion of their annual household income or assets.” Id. at 11. For
20report%20brief.pdf.
14
Available at http://www.hfma.org/HFMA-Initiatives/Patient-FriendlyBilling/PFB-2005-Uninsured-Report.
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others, hospitals offer financial counseling, flexible payment plans, interest-free
loans, and initiatives that help patients apply for grants or Medicaid. Id. at 11-15.
These services advance hospitals’ missions to serve the community—but they also
require substantial time and resources that add to the already massive costs
hospitals absorb to treat the uninsured.
2.

In the final analysis, hospitals and other health care providers provide

tens of billions of dollars worth of uncompensated care per year, including services
to the uninsured and under-insured. Fact Sheet 4. They do not shoulder the burden
alone, however. Supplemental Medicare and Medicaid payment programs also
fund care for the uninsured—in other words, American taxpayers share the cost.
Covering The Uninsured 403-404. State and local governments—taxpayers
again—likewise fund certain of these expenses. Id. at 405. Finally, insured
patients (and their insurers) end up effectively paying some portion of the bills
generated by their uninsured counterparts: As hospitals and other providers absorb
costs of uncompensated care, they have fewer funds to reinvest and to cover their
ongoing expenses, and that in turn drives costs higher. Id. at 406. In short, the
vast cost of health care for the uninsured is, of necessity, borne by the rest of the
nation, and it affects prices in the health care and the health insurance markets. To
say the uninsured render themselves “inactive” by declining to purchase insurance
is to ignore reality. The uninsured still obtain health care; others just pay for it.
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Attempts To Analogize This Case To Lopez Fail.

Appellees argued below that attempts to justify the individual mandate are
too “attenuated” – and thus subject to invalidation under Lopez – because “any
market participation by those subject to the Individual Mandate is at least once
removed from Congress’s purported regulatory target, the healthcare insurance
market.” No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, Docket No. 135 at 23. That argument should
be rejected. This case could not be further from those, such as Lopez, where the
Supreme Court has deemed the inferential chain between the regulated event and
the effect on commerce to be too attenuated to support regulation.
In Lopez, the chain of inferences required to connect the regulated event
(gun possession in a school zone) to a substantial effect on interstate commerce
was long and winding, not to mention unquantifiable. First, one had to assume that
firearm possession in a school zone leads to violent crime; second, that guns in
schools accordingly “threaten[ ] the learning environment”; third, that the
“handicapped educational process” supposedly produced by guns in school zones
would “result in a less productive citizenry”; and finally, that this firearmhampered citizenry would dampen the national economy. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563564. Nearly every step in this chain was a matter of conjecture and hypothesis.
Here, by contrast, the connection between a lack of pre-financed health care
purchases and interstate commerce is immediate and demonstrable: The uninsured
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receive health care, and many cannot pay for it out of pocket. As a result, tens of
billions of dollars a year in costs are absorbed by third parties, distorting the
market. Congress found as much, see 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F), and its findings
were not just rational—they were plainly correct. See Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at
*16 (“[I]individuals are actively choosing to remain outside of a market for a
particular commodity, and, as a result, Congress’s efforts to stabilize prices for that
commodity are thwarted.”). No “inference” is required.
D.

Characterizing The Behavior Of The Uninsured As “Inactivity”
Misperceives The Court’s Task.

The District Court nonetheless found that the uninsured are inactive in the
health insurance market and that Congress, through the individual mandate, is
regulating “inactivity.” Florida, 2011 WL 285683, at *23, *29. But this approach
proves too much: Nearly any behavior that has been, or could be, the object of
legislative regulation could be characterized as “inactivity.” The motel owners in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), for example,
were “inactive” in the sense that they refused to do something—serve black
customers—and were forced to do it by federal law.15 The farmers in Wickard

15

It is no answer to say that Heart of Atlanta involved motel owners who, by
virtue of having at some point chosen to operate a hotel, were in that sense
participating in the stream of commerce. As explained infra at 21-23, activity is a
matter of perspective. Uninsured individuals are active in the stream of commerce
to the same extent as the motel owners in Heart of Atlanta. Motel owners operate
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were “inactive” in the sense that they refused to do something—participate in the
public wheat market—and were “forc[ed] * * * into the market to buy what they
could provide for themselves.” 317 U.S. at 129. And one can imagine a range of
other circumstances in which the regulated individual would be “inactive” and yet
Congress clearly could regulate. Take, for example, protesters who choose to sit
passively at the entrance to nuclear power plants, refusing to move and blocking
the way for crucial employees. Surely Congress would be entitled to forbid that
“inactivity” if it found that it substantially affected the interstate energy market.
Appellees, no doubt, would respond that all of these examples involve some
underlying active component—for example, walking to the nuclear facility to start
the protest. But so too here. Uninsured individuals seek and obtain health care
services in a massive national market. That is an active component, and one that
has a very substantial effect on interstate commerce. Ultimately, whether a
regulated individual is sufficiently “active” is a matter of perspective. As the
Mead court recognized: “It is pure semantics to argue that an individual who
makes a choice to forgo health insurance is not ‘acting,’ especially given the

motels; uninsured individuals seek and receive billions of dollars worth of health
care services every year.
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serious economic and health-related consequences to every individual of that
choice.” Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *18.16
That fact, in turn, dooms the “inactivity” approach. After all, courts are not
in the business of overruling Congress when it comes to characterizing the relevant
facts. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (“We need not determine whether respondents’
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact,
but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”); Wirtz, 392 U.S. at
190 (“ ‘[W]here we find that the legislators * * * have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end.’ ”) (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303304 (1964)). Thus, “within wide limits, it is Congress—not the courts—that
decides how to define a class of activity.” Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42. Here
Congress found that the individual mandate “regulates activity that is commercial
and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when
health care is paid for[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A). Congress was entitled to
understand the market in that way, just as it was entitled to conclude that motel
owners were “active” when they refused service to black customers and that
16

See also Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *19 (“[A]s inevitable participants in the
health care market, individuals cannot be considered ‘inactive’ or ‘passive’ in
choosing to forgo health insurance. Instead, as Defendants argue, such a choice is
not simply a decision whether to consume a particular good or service, but
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Roscoe Filburn was “active” when he refused to buy wheat at retail. The only
question for this Court is whether Congress’s determination was rational. It was,
for all the reasons above.
E.

The District Court’s Slippery-Slope Hypotheticals Are Inapposite.

The District Court cautioned that if Congress can require participants in the
health care market to buy insurance, then “it would be ‘difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power,’ and we would have a Constitution in name only.”
Florida, 2011 WL 285683, at *22, *27 (citation omitted). Thus, according to the
District Court, Congress could exert unprecedented control over individuals’
dietary and transportation decisions—requiring, for example, “that everyone above
a certain income threshold buy a General Motors automobile.” Id. at *24.
But there is a key difference between the ACA and the hypothetical laws
described above: Under the ACA, the activity individuals are being “forced” to
undertake17 is a mere financing mechanism for another activity that they already
undertake: consumption of health care. Congress did not make people obtain that
underlying product in new or different quantities, and this case does not present the

ultimately a decision as to how health care services are to be paid and who pays for
them.”).
17
Individuals, of course, will not actually be forced to purchase health insurance
under the ACA. Those who do not meet an exception (based on income, religious
status, or other bases) will instead be assessed a penalty through the tax system if
they decline to purchase insurance. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1).

23

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 04/12/2011

Page: 33 of 44

question whether Congress could do so. Instead, Congress made sure people pay
for what they get. Put another way, Congress did not make anyone buy a General
Motors vehicle. It instead made sure no one can drive a General Motors vehicle
off the lot and tell the car dealership to bill their neighbor (or to absorb the cost
itself).
The slippery-slope hypotheticals also fail for a second reason: They
completely ignore the fact that Congress may not assert a “substantial effect” on
interstate commerce via unlikely inferential chains. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563564. For example, the District Court suggested that upholding the ACA could
permit Congress to force people to consume a certain amount of broccoli each
week merely “because broccoli is healthy.”18 But to assert that the consumption of
broccoli substantially affects interstate commerce due to its health benefits is to
engage in the same sort of inference-upon-inference logic that was disapproved in
Lopez. (As the District Court explained, Florida, 2011 WL 285683, at *24, the
logic presumably would be something like: Broccoli is healthy; people who eat
healthier tend to be healthier; healthier people are more productive and put less of
a strain on the health care system. Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563). For this
reason, too, the fact that Congress can regulate financing mechanisms in the
nation’s largest economic sector hardly means it has unlimited powers.
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Finally, these hypotheticals are not just inapposite but unrealistic because
they ignore the limits the political process places on Congress’s actions. The
Supreme Court has recognized for two centuries that while the Commerce Clause
power is broad, Congress is restrained by the electorate. Put another way, it has
recognized that “effective restraints on [the] exercise” of the Commerce power
“must proceed from political, rather than from judicial, processes.” Wickard, 317
U.S. at 120 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.), 197 (1824)). To
suggest that Congress would force all Americans to buy a particular make of
vehicle, or buy a pound of broccoli every week,19 or sleep at particular times, 20 or
any of the rest of the pundits’ parade of fantastical hypotheticals, is to abandon all
faith in representative democracy.
III.

APPELLEES’ MEDICAID ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE REJECTED.
The District Court rejected Appellees’ arguments challenging the ACA’s

expansion of the Medicaid program. To the extent Appellees cross-appeal on that
issue, the District Court should be affirmed. Appellees’ argument—that any
substantial change to Medicaid amounts to “coercion” because they rely on
Medicaid’s matching funds and cannot extricate themselves—is wrong as a matter

18

D. Kam, U.S. judge in Pensacola weighs Florida, 19 other states’ challenge of
health care law, Palm Beach Post News, Friday, Dec. 17, 2010.
19
See id.
20
See id.
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of law. The federal courts routinely have held that putting the state to a “hard
choice” does not amount to unlawful coercion. If it were otherwise, the states
could freeze a federal program, and block Congress from improving it in any way,
so long as one participating state happens to rely on the program’s funds.
Medicaid recipients and health care providers—the two constituencies that interact
with and rely on Medicaid the most—would be unable to count on Congress to
make the adjustments needed to keep the Medicaid program working fairly over
time. That is not a sensible rule of law.
A.

Appellees’ Coercion Argument Is Wrong On The Law And The
Facts.

Numerous courts have rejected the precise argument Appellees made below:
that “while [a state’s] choice to participate in Medicaid may have been voluntary, it
now has no choice but to remain in the program in order to prevent a collapse of its
medical system.” California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997).
In rejecting that argument, the courts of appeals have explained that “courts are not
suited to evaluating whether the states are faced * * * with an offer they cannot
refuse or merely with a hard choice.” Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
Appellees argued below that this case is different because the ACA amends
Medicaid in a way past modifications did not. They asserted that “[w]here
Medicaid originally was supposed to address healthcare needs of the poor, the
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ACA requires that States cover virtually anyone who applies and whose income is
up to 38 percent above the federal poverty line.” No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT,
Docket No. 80-1 at 26 (emphases in original).21 They claimed that under the
original Medicaid scheme, states could “ ‘choose to reimburse certain costs of
medical treatment for needy persons,’ ” id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 301 (1980)) (emphases in original), and that that approach has changed. And
they characterized the many Medicaid amendments of the past as “minor
revisions,” contending that the ACA, by contrast, “revolutionizes [the] program.”
Id. at 38.
But these arguments are both irrelevant and factually incorrect. They are
irrelevant because to the extent the “coercion” doctrine suggested by South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), is judicially enforceable, the relevant coercion
logically must arise from the funding Congress holds out as a carrot, not from the
particulars of the program Congress encourages the states to enact.
They are incorrect because they mischaracterize both past Medicaid
amendments and the changes wrought by ACA. The Medicaid statute has long
required states to cover certain categories of Medicaid beneficiaries—as opposed
to letting the states “choose,” No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, Docket No. 80-1 at 26
21

Thirty-eight percent above the federal poverty line for a family of four is
$30,429. The poverty line does not mean that everyone who lives above that line
is financially secure.
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(quotation omitted)—and has long required payments on behalf of individuals with
incomes “above the federal poverty line.” Id. With respect to coverage
requirements, for example, 1972 Medicaid amendments “[r]equired states to
extend Medicaid to SSI recipients or to elderly and disabled” people meeting
certain eligibility criteria. Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & The Uninsured, The
Medicaid Resource Book 175 (App’x 1) (2002).22 A 1984 amendment “[r]equired
states to cover children born after September 30, 1983, up to age 5, in families
meeting state AFDC income and resource standards.” Id. And since 1991, states
have been “required to cover all children over the age of five and under 19 who are
in families with income below 100% of the federal poverty level.” Congressional
Res. Serv., How Medicaid Works: Program Basics 4 (2005).23 With respect to the
income criteria, amendments enacted between 1986 and 1991 “require [states] to
cover pregnant women and children under age 6 with family incomes below 133%
of the federal poverty income guidelines”—the very threshold the plaintiff states
present as a revolutionary change. Id. at 3-4. And a 1990 amendment “[r]equired
states to phase in coverage of Medicare premiums for low-income Medicare
beneficiaries with incomes between 100 and 120 percent of poverty.” Medicaid

22

Available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/
security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14255.
23
Available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/
RL3227703162005.pdf.
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Resource Book 176. These are just a few of many eligibility mandates—including
directives to cover individuals with income (marginally) above the federal poverty
threshold—that have been in place for decades. Appellees’ attempt to portray
ACA’s coverage mandates as a “revolutionary” break from the past is simply
counterfactual.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Argument Has Dangerous Ramifications That Could
Prove Devastating For Hospitals And Their Patients.

Finally, it is important to understand the practical consequences of the
doctrine the states advance: If their theory were law, Congress could not adjust
Medicaid to respond to changes on the ground—demographic developments,
innovations in the medical delivery system, and the like—unless every
participating state agreed to Congress’s proposed modification.
Congress has seen fit to modify Medicaid dozens of times over the decades
to expand eligibility, expand or contract states’ flexibility regarding coverage and
payments, and ensure that healthcare providers are fairly compensated when they
treat Medicaid recipients. In 1980, for example, Congress enacted the “Boren
Amendment” (later repealed), which required states to pay “ ‘reasonable and
adequate’ payment rates” to healthcare providers for the nursing home and hospital
services they offer to Medicaid patients. Medicaid Resource Book 175; see
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499. And as noted above,
between 1986 and 1991, Congress amended Medicaid to require states to cover
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pregnant women and young children with family incomes below 133% of the
federal poverty level. How Medicaid Works 3-4.
Congress presumably enacted these and many similar modifications because
it became convinced, in light of developments in the health care industry, that they
were necessary to keep the system running smoothly and fairly. But if the states’
“coercion” theory were credited, any one participant state could have blocked all of
these improvements—or, perhaps more likely, could have blocked the ones that
increased the state’s costs and allowed others to stand.
This heckler’s veto, of course, flips the Constitution on its head. See
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 330 (1819) (rejecting the suggestion “that
congress can only exercise its constitutional powers, subject to the controlling
discretion, and under the sufferance, of the state governments”). But it also has the
potential to wreak havoc on America’s hospitals and the patients they serve. If
Congress were to determine, for example, that hospitals are being
undercompensated for treating a category of Medicaid patients, or that certain
Medicaid recipients need additional services, it must have the prerogative to revise
the program accordingly. The patients have nowhere else to turn for treatment, and
the healthcare providers have nowhere else to turn for payment. Congress’s best
judgment on these matters cannot be held hostage at the whim of some objecting
states.
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CONCLUSION
Hospitals will continue to care for the uninsured, as they have for
generations, regardless of their ability to pay—and indeed, for many hospitals that
service is at the core of their mission. But let there be no mistake: The choice to
forgo health insurance is not a “passive” choice without concrete consequences.
The health care uninsured Americans obtain has real costs. Their decision to
obtain care, and how to pay for it, is economic activity with massive economic
effects, including the imposition of billions in annual costs on the national
economy. In regulating the national health care industry, Congress possessed
ample authority to address those costs by changing the way uninsured Americans
finance the services they receive and expanding the Medicaid program.
The District Court’s judgment should be reversed as to the individual
mandate and affirmed as to the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid.
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